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Abstract. Filter generators are vulnerable to several attacks which have
led to well-known design criteria on the Boolean filtering function. How-
ever, Rønjom and Cid have observed that a change of the primitive root
defining the LFSR leads to several equivalent generators. They usually
offer different security levels since they involve filtering functions of the
form F (xk) where k is coprime to (2n − 1) and n denotes the LFSR
length. It is proved here that this monomial equivalence does not affect
the resistance of the generator against algebraic attacks, while it usually
impacts the resistance to correlation attacks. Most importantly, a more
efficient attack can often be mounted by considering non-bijective mono-
mial mappings. In this setting, a divide-and-conquer strategy applies
based on a search within a multiplicative subgroup of F∗2n . Moreover, if
the LFSR length n is not a prime, a fast correlation involving a shorter
LFSR can be performed.
Keywords. Stream ciphers, correlation attacks, LFSR, filter generator,
nonlinear equivalence, monomials.
1 Introduction
The running-key used in a stream cipher is produced by a pseudo-random gen-
erator whose initialization is the secret key shared by the users. Linear feedback
shift registers (LFSR) are building-blocks used in many keystream generators
since they are appropriate to low-cost implementations, produce sequences with
good statistical properties and have a simple mathematical description. While
basic LFSR-based generators, like combination generators or filter generators,
are not used directly as keystream generators in modern stream ciphers, they are
still widely used either as a part of the generator or in modified form [13]. This
situation then motivates an in-depth evaluation of the security of LFSR-based
generators. Actually, several modern ciphers have been analyzed by enhanced
variants of attacks, which were first dedicated to simple LFSR-based generators
(e.g. [29,26,34]).
At this aim, our work investigates the security of the so-called filter gener-
ator, which consists of a single LFSR whose content is filtered by a nonlinear
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Boolean function. These generators have been extensively studied and are known
to be vulnerable to several types of attacks, mainly algebraic attacks and their
variants [10,9,38,17] and (fast) correlation attacks [32]. These attacks have led
to the definition of design criteria, especially related to the choice of the filtering
function, and they have initiated a whole line of research on the constructions
of appropriate filtering functions. However, it has been observed more recently
by Rønjom and Cid [36] that a simple change of the primitive characteristic
polynomial of the LFSR (i.e., a change of the primitive root of the underly-
ing finite field), may lead to an equivalent generator whose filtering function
corresponds to the composition of a monomial permutation with the original fil-
tering function, x 7→ F (xk) for some k coprime to (2n− 1) where n is the LFSR
length. This observation opens the door to new weaknesses since the main se-
curity criteria, like the nonlinearity, the degree or the algebraic immunity of the
filtering function, are not invariant under this nonlinear equivalence. Hence, this
raises many open questions about the relevance of the usual criteria, as noted by
Rønjom and Cid. In this context, the objective of our paper is to answer most
of these questions by evaluating the minimal security offered by all generators
derived by monomial equivalence, and to further investigate the possibilities to
transform the constituent LFSR by applying a monomial mapping, especially a
non-bijective monomial mapping.
Our contributions. Our contributions are then two-fold: first, we show that,
even if the degree and the algebraic-immunity of a Boolean function may highly
vary within an equivalence class, the monomial equivalence defined by Rønjom
and Cid has no impact on the resistance of a filter generator against algebraic
attacks and their variants. The reason is that the degree and the algebraic im-
munity are not the relevant parameters for estimating the security of a filter
generator as shown in [28,17,20]. Instead, the complexities of these attacks are
determined by the linear complexity and the spectral immunity of the filtering
function, which are derived from the univariate representation of the function
and are therefore invariant under monomial equivalence. On the other hand, the
second family of attacks, namely (fast) correlation attacks, are highly affected
by monomial equivalence, implying that the associated criterion must be the
generalized nonlinearity of the filtering function as defined in [41]. But we show
that the non-bijective monomial mappings also play a very important role, usu-
ally much more important than monomial permutations, because the LFSR can
then be transformed into an LFSR producing a sequence with smaller period τ . A
divide-and-conquer attack can then be mounted exploiting this property, where
the number of values to be examined decreases from (2n − 1) to τ . Moreover, if
the LFSR length n is not a prime, the new LFSR involved in the attack may be
shorter than the original one, leading to a much more efficient fast correlation
attack.
Organization of the paper. We first introduce the monomial equivalence between
filter generators as described by Rønjom and Cid [36] and show that the univari-
ate representation of both the LFSR and the filtering function is well-suited for
analyzing its impact. Section 3 then focuses on algebraic attacks and proves that
all filter generators obtained by monomial equivalence have the same behaviour
with respect to this family of attacks. Section 4 then investigates correlation at-
tacks and their variants, and shows that the situation is very different. Also, we
describe a new setting for (fast) correlation attacks where non-bijective monomi-
als are used. Two types of attacks are then presented: fast correlation involving a
shorter LFSR which can be mounted when the LFSR length is not a prime, and
correlation attacks based on FFT which recover log2 τ bits of the initial state
where τ is a divisor of (2n − 1).
2 Equivalence between filtered LFSR
2.1 Filtered LFSRs
In the following, we focus on binary filtered LFSRs. The binary LFSR of length n
with characteristic polynomial, P (X) = Xn +
∑n−1
i=0 ciX
i ∈ F2[X], is the finite-
state automaton which produces the binary sequences s = (st)t≥0, satisfying the
linear recurrence relation
st+n =
n−1∑
i=0
cist+i, ∀t ≥ 0 .
In this paper, we implicitly assume that the LFSRs we consider are non-singular,
i.e., the constant term c0 in the characteristic polynomial does not vanish. Other-
wise the transition function of the LFSR is not bijective, leading to a possible loss
of entropy of the internal state, which is clearly not suitable in cryptographic
applications. Also, the characteristic polynomial is assumed to be irreducible,
which guarantees that, for any nonzero initial state of the LFSR, the generated
sequence cannot be produced by a shorter LFSR [42]. In other words, the linear
complexity of any sequence generated by the LFSR from a nonzero initial state is
equal to the LFSR length. A well-known property of LFSR sequences is that any
sequence produced by an LFSR with an irreducible characteristic polynomial P
(and a nonzero initial state) is periodic and its least period is equal to the or-
der of P , i.e., to the smallest positive integer r for which P (X) divides Xr + 1.
Hence, the characteristic polynomials of LFSRs used in practical applications
are chosen primitive. More details on the properties of LFSR sequences can be
found e.g. in [19,25].
In this context, a filter generator (aka filtered LFSR), is a keystream genera-
tor composed of a single binary LFSR of length n whose content is filtered by a
nonlinear Boolean function of n variables. More precisely, the output sequence
(st)t≥0 of the filter generator is given by
st = f(ut+n−1, ut+n−2, . . . , ut), ∀t ≥ 0 ,
where (ut)t≥0 denotes the sequence generated by the LFSR.
It is worth noticing that, in most practical proposals, the filtering function
does not depend on all n bits of the internal state. For obvious implementation
reasons, f is usually chosen in such a way that it depends on m < n variables
only. It can then be equivalently described by an m-variable Boolean function f ′
and a decreasing sequence (γi)1≤i≤m, with 1 ≤ γi ≤ n, such that for any n-tuple
(x1, . . . , xn),
f(x1, . . . , xn) = f
′(xγ1 , . . . , xγm) .
Here, unless explicitly mentioned, the filtering function will be defined as a func-
tion of n variables, where n is the LFSR length, even if some (or most) of these
variables are not involved in the evaluation of the function.
2.2 Univariate representation of filtered LFSRs
Filter generators have been extensively studied and are known to be vulnera-
ble to several types of attacks which have led to the definition of some security
criteria on the tapping sequence (γi)1≤i≤m [14] and on the Boolean filtering
function (see e.g. [4] for a survey). For instance, it is well-known that f must
have a high algebraic degree in order to generate a keystream sequence with a
high linear complexity [39], a high algebraic-immunity in order to resist alge-
braic attacks [10,31] and a high nonlinearity in order to resist fast correlation
attacks [32]. These design criteria on the filtering function must be considered
up to some equivalence in the sense that several filtered LFSR may generate the
same set of sequences. This equivalence between filtered LFSR can be simply
described by defining the LFSR next-state function over the finite field with
2n elements instead of the vector space Fn2 .
In this field-oriented description, we will use the following classical notation.
The finite field with 2n elements is denoted by F2n . The multiplicative order of
a nonzero element α in a finite field, ord(α), is the smallest positive integer r
such that αr = 1. The trace function from F2n into F2 is denoted by Trn, i.e.,
Trn(x) =
n−1∑
i=0
x2
i
.
The index n will omitted if it is clear from the context.
Proposition 1 (Th. 9.2 in [30]). Let P be an irreducible polynomial in F2[X]
with degree n. Let α ∈ F2n be a root of P and {β0, . . . , βn−1} denote the dual
basis of {1, α, . . . , αn−1}, i.e.,
Trn(αiβj) =
{
0 if i 6= j
1 if i = j
.
Then, the content of the LFSR with characteristic polynomial P at time (t+ 1)
is equal to its content at time t multiplied by α, where these vectors are identified
with elements in the field F2n decomposed on the basis {β0, . . . , βn−1}.
With the notation of the previous proposition, we consider the isomorphism ϕ
from Fn2 into F2n defined by the basis {β0, . . . , βn−1}. Then, the internal state
at time t of the LFSR initialized by X0 = ϕ(u0, . . . , un−1) corresponds to
Xt = X0α
t
and the keystream bit at time t is given by
st = f ◦ ϕ−1(X0αt) .
Therefore, any filter generator has an equivalent univariate representation de-
fined by a root α ∈ F2n of the LFSR characteristic polynomial, and a function
F from F2n into F2. This generator produces from any initial state X0 ∈ F2n
the sequence st = F (X0α
t). For the sake of clarity, univariate functions defined
over F2n will be denoted by capital letters, while small letters will be used for
multivariate functions over Fn2 . Clearly, the multivariate representation of a fil-
ter generator, (P, f), can be recovered from its univariate representation (α, F ):
since P is irreducible, it corresponds to the minimal polynomial of α and f
is equal to F ◦ ϕ where ϕ is the isomorphism associated to the dual basis of
{1, α, α2, . . . , αn−1}. Conversely, a given multivariate representation (P, f) cor-
responds to n univariate representations (α, F ) since there are several possible
values for α corresponding to the conjugate roots of P , i.e., α, α2, α2
2
, . . . , α2
n−1
.
The univariate filtering functions F associated to the different choices for α
are then linearly equivalent because they only differ from the composition with
the Frobenius map. However, composing F with a linear permutation does not
change its cryptographic properties (see the next section for details).
As a function from F2n into F2n , F can be written as a univariate polyno-
mial in F2n [X] and the coefficients of this polynomial are computed from the
values of F by the discrete Fourier Transform (DFT) of F (aka Mattson-Solomon
transform) (see e.g. [2,27,15]).
Proposition 2 (Discrete Fourier transform of a function). Let F be a
function from F2n into F2n . Then, there exists a unique univariate polynomial
in F2n [X]/(X2
n
+X) such that
F (X) =
2n−1∑
i=0
AiX
i .
Moreover, A0 = F (0), A2n−1 =
∑
x∈F2n F (x) and the coefficients Ai, 1 ≤ i ≤
2n − 2, are given by the discrete Fourier transform of the values of F at all
nonzero inputs, namely
Ai =
2n−2∑
k=0
F (γk)γ−ki, 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2
where γ is a primitive element in F2n .
It is worth noticing that, in our context, the value of F (0) does not affect the
security of the filter generator: this value is only involved when the LFSR internal
state vanishes, which is obviously always avoided since the sequence generated
from the all-zero state is constant. Therefore, we will always consider in the
following that the coefficient of degree (2n − 1) in the univariate form of F
is equal to zero. In other words, the univariate form of F is identified with
(A0, . . . , A2n−2) which is the DFT of the values of F . In our situation also,
F takes its values in F2, implying that A2i = A2i for any 1 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2.
In this case, the coefficients Ai for all i in the same cyclotomic coset modulo
(2n − 1), C(i) = {i, 2i mod (2n − 1), 22i mod (2n − 1), . . . , 2n−1i mod (2n − 1)}
can be gathered, leading to the so-called trace representation:
F (X) =
∑
k∈Γ
Trnk(AkX
k),
where Γ is a set of representatives of all cyclotomic cosets modulo (2n − 1), nk
denotes the size of the cyclotomic coset of k and Ak ∈ F2nk .
2.3 Monomial equivalence between filtered LFSR
Using the univariate representation, it is easy to observe that, for any nonzero λ ∈
F2n , the sequence generated by the filtered LFSR with characteristic polynomial
P and filtering function F from the initial state X0 ∈ F2n is the same as the
sequence obtained by filtering the same LFSR with G(x) = F (λx) from the
initial state Y0 = λ
−1X0. It follows that not only F but also any function
G(x) = F (λx) can be attacked when cryptanalyzing the generator. But, this
equivalence does not affect the security of filter generators since all design criteria
are known to be invariant under linear equivalence, i.e., under the composition
of the filtering function by an F2-linear permutation of F2n .
However, Rønjom and Cid [36] exhibited some nonlinear equivalence relations
between filtered LFSR when the LFSR characteristic polynomial P is primitive.
This equivalence relation boils down to changing the primitive root of F2n in
the univariate representation of the generator. Let us consider two primitive
elements in F2n , namely α and β, implying that β = αk for some integer k
with gcd(k, 2n − 1) = 1. Let Pα and Pβ denote their minimal polynomials.
Then, we observe that, at any time t ≥ 0, the internal state Xt of the LFSR
with characteristic polynomial Pα and the internal state Yt of the LFSR with
characteristic polynomial Pβ initialized with Y0 = X
k
0 satisfy
Yt = Y0β
t =
(
X0α
t
)k
= Xkt .
This implies that the set of all sequences obtained by filtering by F the LFSR
defined by α corresponds to the sequences generated by filtering byG(x) = F (xr)
the LFSR defined by β = αk where rk ≡ 1 mod (2n − 1). From now on, this
equivalence between filter generators will be named monomial equivalence1. It
follows that there exist Φ(2
n−1)
n monomial transformations which are not linearly
equivalent and nevertheless provide equivalent filtering LFSR, where Φ is the
Euler’s totient function. Any attack against one among these Φ(2
n−1)
n generators
then provides an attack against the whole class. Most notably, an initial-state
recovery attack against the generator defined by β enables the attacker to recover
1 Note that, among all monomials, only the permutations of F2n , i.e., X 7→ Xk with
gcd(k, 2n − 1) = 1 provide an equivalence relation.
the initial state X0 of the LFSR defined by α by using that X0 = Y
r
0 . Therefore,
the security level offered by a filter generator is clearly the minimal security
among all generators in its equivalence class.
3 Monomial equivalence and algebraic attacks
Determining the cryptographic properties of a Boolean function up to any change
of the primitive element seems rather complicated, since the major properties of
the function, like its degree or its nonlinearity, are not invariant under these non-
linear transformations (see e.g. [36, Appendix A]). However, the recent works by
Gong, Helleseth and Rønjom [38,37,20,17] point out that this difficulty mainly
comes from the fact that the multivariate representation of the function is usually
not relevant for evaluating its security level. Instead, the univariate representa-
tion provides a much more powerful tool which allows to directly determine
the security offered by a generator against algebraic attacks (and its variants).
Indeed, the action of the monomial equivalence can be described in a much sim-
pler way when the univariate expression of the function is considered: the class
of all filtering functions in the equivalence class of F consists of all functions
G =
∑2n−2
i=0 BiX
i whose univariate representation (B0, . . . , B2n−2) is obtained
by decimating the univariate representation of F by some integer k coprime
to (2n − 1), i.e., Bi = Aik mod (2n−1). Using this simple transformation, it be-
comes possible to determine how the complexity of algebraic-type attacks varies
within the equivalence class of a filtering function.
3.1 Linear complexity
The simplest algebraic attack consists in writing the Boolean equations defining
the successive keystream bits. We then obtain a multivariate system depending
on n binary unknowns, which are the bits of the initial state. The degree of
each equation is equal to the degree of the filtering function f , which tends to
show that the complexity for solving this algebraic system highly depends on
the degree of f . Instead of linearizing the system of degree deg(f) derived from
f , another strategy consists in exploiting the fact that the keystream sequence
produced by a filter generator can also be seen as the output of a single LFSR.
The length of the shortest LFSR generating the sequence is its linear complexity
Λ. It determines the complexity of solving the smallest linear system expressing
each output bit of the generator as a linear function of its initial state. It is widely
believed that, exactly as for the combination generator, the linear complexity of a
filter generator increases with the degree of the filtering function (see e.g. [24,39]).
For instance, it has been shown by Rueppel that, when the LFSR length n
is a large prime, Λ ≥
(
n
d
)
for most functions f of degree d [39, Chapter 5].
However, as explained in [28], the well-known Blahut’s theorem [2] implies that
Λ is entirely determined by the univariate form of the filtering function, F (X) =∑2n−2
i=0 AiX
i:
Λ = #{0 ≤ i ≤ 2n − 2 : Ai 6= 0} .
Then, it clearly appears from this formula that the linear complexity of the filter
generator is invariant under monomial equivalence since decimating the vector
(A0, . . . , A2n−2) by some k coprime to (2
n − 1) does not modify the number of
its nonzero terms.
A major observation due to Rønjom and Helleseth [38] is that the linear
complexity is always smaller than or equal to the number of unknowns we expect
in a linearized version of the system of equations derived from the multivariate
representation. Indeed, the resulting linear system considers as unknowns all
monomials of degree at most deg(f) in the bits of the initial state, i.e. roughly
Λ = Λ(F ) ,
deg f∑
i=1
(
n
i
)
unknowns.
Using that the multivariate degree of the univariate monomial Xk is the number
of ones in the binary representation of k, which is identified with wH(k), we get
that all coefficients Ak with wH(k) > deg f vanish. Therefore, the linear com-
plexity Λ of the generator, i.e., the number of nonzero Ak, is at most the number
of k such that wH(k) ≤ deg(f), which corresponds to the number of unknowns
in the multivariate linear system. Therefore, for any filter generator obtained
by monomial equivalence, the best basic algebraic attack has data complexity
O(Λ). The on-line step of the attack has time complexity O(Λ) (since the knowl-
edge of Λ keystream bits determines the initial state of the equivalent LFSR and
the whole output sequence). The precomputation step consists in computing the
linear complexity and the minimal polynomial of the keystream. This can be
done by applying Berlekamp-Massey algorithm to the filter generator initialized
by any chosen value, with time complexity O(Λ2). This can also be done by
inverting a Λ × Λ Vandermonde matrix, with time complexity O(Λ log2 Λ) as
noticed in [38,17,35]. Another equivalent point of view, which yields the same
complexity, is the so-called selective discrete Fourier spectra attack [16,17]. The
complexities of all variants of this attack are then invariant under monomial
equivalence.
3.2 Algebraic attacks
The fact that algebraic attacks can be applied to any generator obtained by
monomial equivalence has led Rønjom and Cid to define the general algebraic
immunity of a filtering function F [36, Def. 6] as the smallest algebraic immunity
for a function in the monomial equivalence class of F . But, exactly as algebraic
attacks allow to decrease the degree of the equations below the degree of the
filtering function by considering an annihilator g of f [10], the same idea can
be used for improving the previously described attack based on the univariate
approach [17]. Then, the complexity of the best attack is determined by the
smallest linear complexity for an annihilator of F . This quantity has been named
the spectral immunity of F [17, Def. 1]. As we discussed before, for any function
G, including any annihilator of F ,
Λ(G) ≤
degG∑
i=0
(
n
i
)
,
implying that this attack based on the univariate approach is always faster than
the usual algebraic attack.
Suppose now that the previously described attack is applied to some equiva-
lent filter generator involving the filtering function F ′ defined as F ′(x) = F (xk),
for some k with gcd(k, 2n − 1) = 1. The attack then exploits the linear com-
plexity of an annihilator G′ of F ′. But, it can be observed that a function G′ is
an annihilator of F ′ if and only if G(x) = G′(xr) is an annihilator of F where
rk ≡ 1 mod (2n − 1). Then, the linear complexity of G′ is then equal to the
linear complexity of G, the corresponding annihilator of F . It follows that the
attack applied to F ′ has the same complexity as the attack against the original
filter generator. In other words, the spectral immunity of a filtering function F
is invariant under monomial equivalence.
Therefore, it appears that the monomial equivalence does not affect the com-
plexity of algebraic attacks since the optimal versions of these attacks are based
on the univariate representation and involve the number of nonzero coefficients
in this representation which is invariant under monomial equivalence.
4 Univariate correlation attacks
4.1 Correlation-like attacks on filtered LFSR
Another type of attacks against LFSR-based stream ciphers is the correlation
attack and its variants. For generators using many LFSR combined by a Boolean
function, a divide-and-conquer technique can be used by exploiting an approxi-
mation of the combining function f by a function g with fewer variables [40]. The
attack then consists in performing an exhaustive search for the internal state of
the small generator (called the target generator) composed of fewer LFSR com-
bined by g, and in deciding which one of the states gives an output sequence
having the expected correlation with the keystream. A well-known improved
variant, named fast correlation attack [32] applies when g is linear. It identifies
the problem with a decoding problem. Then an exhaustive search for the ini-
tial state of the target generator is not required anymore. Instead, a decoding
algorithm for a linear code is used, for instance an algorithm exploiting sparse
parity-check relations [32,6,8]. In the case of filtered LFSR, the situation is dif-
ferent since the only relevant target generator producing sequences correlated to
the keystream, consists of an LFSR of the same size as the original generator
filtered by a linear approximation of f . In this situation, the classical correlation
attack cannot be faster than a brute-force attack, implying that only fast cor-
relation attacks are relevant on filtered LFSR. To avoid these attacks, filtering
functions must have a high nonlinearity.
Rønjom and Cid [36, Section 6.2] have then pointed out that the monomial
equivalence requires extending the nonlinearity criterion. As the nonlinearity of
a Boolean function f is the distance of f to all affine functions, the distance to
all monomial functions with an exponent coprime to (2n−1) must also be taken
into account. Indeed, the fast correlation attack can be generalized as follows.
Let us consider an LFSR of size n, of primitive root α and of initial state X0,
filtered by a Boolean function F . We suppose now that there exist λ ∈ F2n\{0}
and k coprime to (2n − 1) such that the function F is highly correlated to
G(x) = Trn(λxk). Because k is coprime to (2n − 1), the monomial equivalence
can be applied to the LFSR filtered by G, as depicted on Figure 1. Then we
Pα F
st
Pα G
σt
Compare
X0
X0
Pα F
st
X0
Compare
σt
Pαk
Xk0
Fig. 1: Generalized correlation attack where gcd(k, 2n − 1) = 1 and G(x) =
Trn(λxk).
can perform a fast correlation attack and recover the initial state of the LFSR
defined by αk, which corresponds to Xk0 . As k is coprime to (2
n − 1), we then
recover X0. In other words, a fast correlation attack can be mounted even if the
approximation G of F is nonlinear but has a trace representation with a single
term, Trn(λxk) with gcd(k, 2n − 1) = 1. The corresponding design criterion is
that the filtering function F must have a high generalized nonlinearity. This
notion has been first introduced by Youssef and Gong in 2001 [41], but was not
motivated by any attack.
Definition 1 (Extended Walsh-transform [41]). Let F a function from F2n
into F2, then its extended Walsh transform is
F̂ (λ, k) =
∑
x∈F2n
(−1)F (x)+Tr(λx
k)
where λ ∈ F2n and gcd(k, 2n − 1) = 1. Then, the generalized nonlinearity:
NLG(F ) = 2n−1 − 1
2
max
λ∈F2n
k:gcd(k,2n−1)=1
|F̂ (λ, k)|
is the distance of F to the components of all monomial permutations of F2n .
4.2 A more efficient correlation attack
The previously described attack applies when F is correlated with a monomial
function whose exponent k is coprime to (2n−1). However, the exponents k with
gcd(k, 2n−1) > 1 must also be taken into account even if they do not provide an
equivalence relation. Let us now consider some k which is not coprime to (2n−1)
and some Boolean function H such that F is correlated to G : x 7→ H(xk).
We can then also apply some monomial transformation to the target generator
which is composed of the LFSR defined by α filtered by G. Indeed, the LFSR
Pα F
st
Pα G
σt
Compare
X0
X0
Pα F
st
Pαk H
σt
Compare
X0
Xk0
Fig. 2: Generalized correlation attack where gcd(k, 2n − 1) > 1.
internal state at time t is X0α
t, implying that the sequence produced by the
target generator is σt = G(X0α
t) = H(Xk0α
kt) for all t ≥ 0. On the other hand,
the LFSR with characteristic polynomial Pαk generates the successive internal
states (Y0α
kt)t≥0, implying that σ can also be generated by the LFSR defined
by αk filtered by H. In other words, the two generators produce exactly the
same sequence if the initial state of the LFSR defined by αk satisfies Y0 = X
k
0 ,
as depicted on Figure 2. It is important to notice that the least period of the
sequence generated by the LFSR defined by αk is
τk = ord(α
k) =
2n − 1
gcd(k, 2n − 1)
.
We will see that this quantity plays a major role in the attack.
Firstly, the number of possible values for an initial state of the target LFSR
of the form Y0 = X
k
0 is τk. As previously mentioned, the classical correlation
attack described by Siegenthaler is not relevant against filter generators because
it requires an exhaustive search over all possible initial states of the constituent
LFSR, leading to a time complexity higher than or equal to the cost of a brute-
force attack. But, in our new setting, the attacker needs to perform an exhaustive
search over a set of size τk < 2
n, implying that this exhaustive search may be
faster than the brute-force attack. More precisely, the data complexity required
for applying the optimal hypothesis test (i.e., defined by the Neyman-Pearson
lemma) and determining the correct initialization out of τk possibilities is
N =
2 ln(τk)
ε2
where ε is the correlation between F and G (see e.g. [18, Section 4.1]). The time
complexity of Siegenthaler’s algorithm is
Time = O
(
τk ln(τk)
ε2
)
.
The counter-part of this attack compared to the case where k is coprime to
(2n− 1) is that the knowledge of the quantity recovered in the attack, Xk0 , does
not enable us to determine the whole initial state X0 since k is no longer coprime
to (2n − 1). However, we get some information on X0.
Lemma 1. The knowledge of Xk0 gives log2(τk) bits of information on X0 where
τk = (2
n − 1)/ gcd(k, 2n − 1).
Proof. Let X0 be a non-zero element in the field F2n and α a primitive root.
There is a unique i ∈ [0, 2n − 2] such that X0 = αi. Then, r = i mod τk satisfies
Xk0 = α
qkτkαrk = αrk
by definition of τk. Moreover, r is the unique integer in [0, τk − 1] such that
Xk0 = α
rk. Indeed, if there exist r1 and r2, r1 > r2 such that α
r1k = αr2k then
α(r1−r2)k = 1. Then, (r1 − r2) is a multiple of τk which is the order of αk. This
is impossible since r2− r1 ∈ [0, τk− 1]. Therefore, for X0 = αi, the knowledge of
Xk0 gives the value of the remainder of the Euclidean division of i by τk. It then
provides log2(τk) bits of information on X0. ut
4.3 Recovering the remaining bits of the initial state
Once Xk0 has been recovered, the remaining (n− log(τk)) bits of X0 can be found
by an exhaustive search with time complexity proportional to
2n − 1
τk
= gcd(k, 2n − 1) .
Another method consists in combining several correlation attacks in a divide-
and-conquer approach, exactly as against combination generators. Suppose that
there exist two integers k1 and k2 such that the two distinct correlation attacks
can be performed in order to successively recover Xk10 and X
k2
0 . This means that
we have found
r1 = i mod τk1 and r2 = i mod τk2 .
By the Chinese remainder theorem, this leads to the value of the remainder of
the Euclidean division of i by lcm(τk1 , τk2). The best situation for the attacker
is obviously the case where τk1 and τk2 are coprime, otherwise there is some
redundancy between the information retrieved by the two distinct attacks.
4.4 Fast correlation attack when H is linear
In the correlation attack, the target generator is composed of the LFSR defined
by αk filtered by a Boolean function H, and it generates sequences σ with period
τk < (2
n−1). Then, as noticed in the pioneer work by Meier and Staffelbach [32],
any N -bit portion of σ can be seen as a codeword in a code of length N and
size τk. Therefore, recovering the initial state of the target generator boils down
to decoding the corresponding n-bit keystream with respect to this code since
the keystream can be identified with the result of the transmission of σ through
a binary symmetric channel with error-probability 12 (1 − ε) where ε is the cor-
relation between the two sequences.
In the specific case where the function H defining G(x) = H(xk) is linear, i.e.,
H(x) = Tr(λx) for some λ ∈ F2n , the involved code is a linear code. Some decod-
ing algorithms dedicated to linear codes can then be used. These algorithms are
faster than the exhaustive search (which corresponds to a maximum-likelihood
decoding), at the price of a higher data complexity. The corresponding attack is
then named fast correlation attack [32]. Obviously, a major parameter affecting
the complexity of the decoding procedure is the dimension of the involved code.
This dimension is the degree of the minimal polynomial of αk, which may be
smaller than n: it corresponds to the size nk of the cyclotomic class of k. Equiv-
alently, nk is the smallest integer m such that 2
m ≡ 1 mod τk. In other words,
if αk belongs to a subfield F2m of F2n , then the fast correlation attack consists
in decoding a linear code of dimension m, instead of a code of dimension n.
This may enable the attacker to recover log2(τk) bits of the initial state with a
lower complexity than the fast correlation attack involving the original LFSR of
length n. The optimal situation which maximizes the number of bits recovered
by the attacker for a given complexity is then when τk = 2
m−1 for some divisor
m of n, i.e., when k is such that gcd(k, 2n−1) = (2n−1)/(2m−1). Several decod-
ing algorithms have been proposed in this context [32,21,6,7,22,33,8] which offer
different trade-offs between the dimension of the code and the error probability
(see [1] for a recent survey).
Example 1. Let us consider an LFSR of size 10 with primitive characteristic
polynomial P (X) = X10 +X9 +X7 +X6 +X5 +X4 +X3 +X2 +1. We then use
as a filtering function a balanced function of 10 variables with a high nonlinearity
obtained by Dobbertin’s construction [12]. As described by Dobbertin, we start
from a bent function which is constant on a subspace of dimension n2 and replace
this constant restriction by a balanced function in order to make the whole
function balanced. Here we start from Tr(αx33) where α is a root of P since
this function is bent, and modify it as in [12]. It is worth noticing that this
modification makes the function much more complex. In particular, it increases
its degree and its linear complexity, at the price of a very small degradation of
its nonlinearity. We construct this way a balanced function F of 10 variables
with nonlinearity 481 and algebraic immunity 3. By computing its univariate
representation, we get that the linear complexity of the keystream is equal to 992.
Therefore, this filtering function meets all design criteria related to algebraic-
like attacks and to fast correlation attacks. However, by construction, our filtered
function F is very close to the Boolean function G(x) = Tr(αx33). This means
that the keystream is highly correlated to the output of the LFSR defined by α33.
Indeed, the correlation between the two sequences equals ε = 1−2−9dH(F,G) =
0.96. We can mount a fast correlation attack on an LFSR of size 5, and we recover
almost 5 bits of the internal state of the generator. This attack is obviously much
faster than the usual fast correlation attack: in our new setting, the involved
correlation is ε = 0.96 and the code dimension is n33 = 5, while the usual fast
correlation attack corresponds to a correlation ε′ = 1−481×2−9 = 0.06 and code
dimension n = 10. The remaining 5 bits of the initial state can be determined
by an exhaustive search over 33 possible values.
The previous example was rather specific since the filtering function is de-
signed from a component of a monomial mapping xk with k of the form k =
(2n−1)
(2m−1) . However, a similar situation may happen for many other filtering func-
tions which do not have any such specific structure. In order to quantify the
advantage of this new setting, we first need a closer look at the complexity of
fast correlation attacks. The decoding algorithms used in this context include
some methods exploiting the existence of low-weight parity-check relations for
the LFSR sequence [32,21,6,8]. These relations are derived from sparse multiples
of the LFSR characteristic polynomial, implying that the data complexity which
corresponds the degree of these multiples grows very fast with the LFSR length
(unless the LFSR characteristic polynomial is very sparse). Once these relations
have been found in a precomputation step, the attack consists in applying an
iterative decoding algorithm. For instance, the complexity of the original attack
based on parity-check relations with 3 terms is estimated by [6]:
Data = O
(
1
ε
× 2n2
)
and Time = O
((
1
ε
)3
× 2n2
)
.
Using parity-check relations with a higher weight w decreases the influence of
the LFSR length by replacing 2n/2 by 2n/(w−1), at the price of a higher influence
of the correlation, i.e., in the data complexity ε is replaced by ε2(w−2)/(w−1).
The time complexity can be improved by different techniques, but the data
complexity of most of these algorithms has a similar behaviour.
Example 2. Let us consider the same LFSR of size 10 as in Example 1, but now
filtered by a Boolean function which is not constructed from a monomial func-
tion. We choose as a filtering function the following function of 6 variables:
f(x0, x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) = x0x1x2x3x4 +x0x1x2x3x5 +x0x1x2x4x5 +x0x1x2x4 +
x0x1x2 +x0x1x3x4 +x0x1x3 +x0x1x4 +x0x1x5 +x0x1 +x0x2x3x4 +x0x2x3x5 +
x0x2x4x5 + x0x2x4 + x0x2 + x0x3x4 + x0x4 + x0 + x1x2x3x4x5 + x1x2x3x4 +
x1x2x3x5 + x1x2x3 + x1x2x4 + x1x2 + x1x3x5 + x1x3 + x1x4 + x1x5 + x1 +
x2x3x4x5 + x2x3x4 + x2x3x5 + x2x3 + x2 + x3x4 + x4x5 + x4
and the inputs of f are given by the following tapping sequence (γ1, . . . , γ6) =
(9, 8, 6, 3, 1, 0). The corresponding 10-variable function has nonlinearity 352, al-
gebraic immunity 3 and the linear complexity of the generated keystream is 637.
But there exists a function G of the form G(x) = Tr(λx33) at distance 456 from
F . The correlation between the keystream and the output of a non-filtered LFSR
of size n33 = 5 is then equal to ε = 0.11. A fast correlation attack in this setting
appears to be more efficient than the usual fast correlation attack, which has
parameters n = 10 and ε′ = 0.31. For instance, if the iterative algorithm with
parity-check relations of weight 3 is used, the ratio between the data complexities
of the two attacks is given by
Data
Data′
=
(
ε′
ε
)
× 2
n33−n
2 = 0.498 .
4.5 Correlation attack using a Fast Fourier Transform when H is
nonlinear
In the general case, i.e., when H is nonlinear, the correlation attack, as originally
described in [40] corresponds to an exhaustive search over all initial states of the
target generator of the form Y0 = X
k
0 . For each of these Y0, the first N bits of
the corresponding output sequence σ are generated and the correlation between
σ and the keystream is computed, namely
N−1∑
t=0
(−1)st+σt (1)
where N is the number of keystream bits we need to be able to detect the bias,
i.e., N = 2 ln(τk)ε2 where ε is the expected correlation. The time complexity of this
algorithm is therefore proportional to
τk ×N =
2τk ln(τk)
ε2
.
We will now show that this time complexity can be improved by using a fast
Fourier transform even when H is nonlinear2. A similar technique has been
described in [34,5] but in an attack against combination generators. We now
prove that it also applies in our context.
Let 〈αk〉 denote the multiplicative subgroup of F∗2n generated by αk, i.e.,
the set with τk elements {1, αk, α2k, · · · , α(τk−1)k}. This set is composed of all
possible internal states Y0 = X
k
0 which must be examined in the attack. Then,
the attacker aims at finding the initial state Y0 ∈ 〈αk〉 which maximizes the
correlation given by (1) where σt = H(Y0α
kt). For any Y0 ∈ 〈αk〉, we compute
Z(Y0) =
N−1∑
t=0
(st ⊕ σt) =
τk−1∑
r=0
dN−rτk e−1∑
q=0
(sqτk+r ⊕ σr)
2 The use of a fast Fourier transform for computing the correlation in the linear case
has been pointed out by several authors including [8,26].
since for any t, σt = σt+τk . We then deduce
Z(Y0) =
τk−1∑
r=0
(σr⊕1)
d
N−r
τk
e−1∑
q=0
sqτk+r
+τk−1∑
r=0
σr
⌈N − r
τk
⌉
−
dN−rτk e−1∑
q=0
sqτk+r
 .
For any 0 ≤ r < τk, we set
S(r) =
dN−rτk e−1∑
q=0
sqτk+r .
Then, we have
Z(Y0) =
τk−1∑
r=0
(σr ⊕ 1)S(r) +
τk−1∑
r=0
σr
(⌈N − r
τk
⌉
− S(r)
)
=
τk−1∑
r=0
(−1)σr
(
S(r)− 1
2
⌈N − r
τk
⌉)
+
N
2
.
It follows that
N−1∑
t=0
(−1)st+σt(Y0) = N − 2Z(Y0) =
τk−1∑
r=0
(−1)σr(Y0)
(⌈N − r
τk
⌉
− 2S(r)
)
.
We need to compute this value for Y0 = α
ik for every 0 ≤ i < τk. But,
σt(α
ik) = H(αikαtk) = H(α(t+i)k) = σt+i(1) .
In other words, we search for the integer i, 0 ≤ i < τk which maximizes the value
τk−1∑
r=0
(−1)σr+i mod τk (1)
(⌈N − r
τk
⌉
− 2S(r)
)
,
which corresponds to the convolution product of two vectors of length τk, namely
(σt(1))0≤t<τk and (S(t))0≤t<τk . This can be done efficiently with a fast Fourier
transform with time complexity O(τk log τk) (see e.g. [3] or [23, Page 299]). The
memory complexity of the attack is then O(τk) and the overall time complexity
(including the computation of all S(t)) is then roughly
Time = τk log τk +
2 ln(τk)
ε2
.
Example 3. Let us consider the LFSR of size 12 with characteristic polynomial
P (X) = X12 + X10 + X9 + X8 + X7 + X5 + X4 + X3 + X2 + X + 1 and
filtered by the same 6-variable function as in Example 2, but where the inputs
of F are now defined by the tapping sequence (γ1, . . . , γ6) = (11, 10, 7, 5, 2, 0).
Then, the correlation between F and any function of the form G = Tr(λxk)
with k = ` 2
n−1
2m−1 and gcd(`, 2
n − 1) = 1 is too low for improving on the classical
correlation attack. However, we can use k = 45 which satisfies ord(αk) = 91.
In this case, we are able to get a higher correlation since we allow all possible
functions H, not only the linear ones. Here, the best approximation by a function
of the form G(x) = H(xk) gives us a correlation equal to 0.125. With an FFT,
the attack requires roughly (592 + 574) = 1166 operations, and 574 keystream
bits. The whole initial state can then be recovered by an exhaustive search.
4.6 Approximation of the filtering function by H(xk)
All previous correlation attacks exploit the existence of a function G of the
form G(x) = H(xk) for some k with gcd(k, 2n − 1) > 1, which provides a good
approximation of F . In particular, the fast correlation attacks involving a shorter
LFSR point out that the notion of generalized nonlinearity as defined in [41] must
be extended in order to capture these new attacks: it appears that the distance
of the filtering function to all Tr(λxk) with k = ` × 2
n−1
2m−1 where m is a divisor
of n and gcd(`, 2n − 1) = 1 is a much more relevant quantity than its distance
to the components of monomial permutations.
Moreover, even if such a fast correlation attack is not feasible, for instance
if n is a prime, an efficient correlation attack may be possible based on the
approximation of F by G(x) = H(xk) for some k with gcd(k, 2n − 1) > 1. As
observed in the previous example, the fact that H can be nonlinear usually yields
a higher correlation. The best approximation of the form G(x) = H(xk) can be
computed from F as follows. For the sake of simplicity, we now suppose that k
is a divisor of (2n − 1), or equivalently that τ = (2n − 1)/k (otherwise, we get
similar results by replacing k by gcd(k, 2n−1)). Let 〈ατ 〉 be the cyclic subgroup
of F2n of order k. Then, by shifting this cyclic subgroup, we obtain the sets
Ei = α
i〈ατ 〉, for 0 ≤ i < τ which provide the partition
F∗2n =
τ−1⋃
i=0
Ei
where all sets Ei, for 0 ≤ i < τ , are disjoint. It follows that G is constant on any
set Ei since, for x = α
i × αjτ , we have
G(x) = H((αiαjτ )k) = H(αik) .
The correlation between F and G can therefore be expressed as follows:∑
x∈F2n
(−1)F (x)+H(x
k) = 1 +
∑
x∈F∗
2n
(−1)F (x)+H(x
k)
= 1 +
τ−1∑
i=0
(−1)H(α
ik)
∑
y∈Ei
(−1)F (y)
 . (2)
If gcd(k, τ) = 1, all values αik, for 0 ≤ i < τ belong to different sets Ej . Hence,
the function H which maximizes this correlation is the function defined by
H(αik) =
{
0 if
∑
y∈Ei(−1)
F (y) > 0
1 if
∑
y∈Ei(−1)
F (y) < 0
In other words, H(αik) = 1 if and only if the Hamming weight of the restriction
of F to Ei is strictly greater than k/2. It can be observed that H is uniquely
determined because the weight of the restriction of F cannot be equal to k/2
since k is odd. This also implies that, for the optimal choice of H, we obtain
∑
x∈F2n
(−1)F (x)+H(x
k) = 1 +
τ−1∑
i=0
∣∣∣ ∑
y∈Ei
(−1)F (y)
∣∣∣ ≥ 1 + τ
since each term in the sum is at least 1. Therefore, for any F , we can always find
a function H such that the correlation between F and G(x) = H(xk) is at least
(1 + τ)2−n ' k−1. It is worth noticing that this lower bound on the correlation
does not decrease when the LFSR length n increases.
In the case where gcd(k, τ) = d > 1, we have that αik and α(i+
τ
d )k belong to
the same set Ej . Indeed, α
kτ
d ∈ 〈ατ 〉. Equation (2) can then be rewritten as
∑
x∈F2n
(−1)F (x)+H(x
k) = 1 +
τ
d−1∑
i=0
(−1)H(α
ik)
d−1∑
j=0
 ∑
y∈Ei+j τ
d
(−1)F (y)
 .
In this case, the value of H at point αik is defined by the weight of the restriction
of F to the set
⋃d−1
j=0 Ei+j τd . Using again that this set has an odd cardinality, we
get that the correlation between F and G(x) = H(xk) is at least (1 + τd )2
−n.
While in usual (fast) correlation attacks, choosing a filtering function with
a high nonlinearity guarantees that the attack will be infeasible, this is not the
case here. For instance, some bent functions in the so-called class PS− [11] are
constant on all sets λ〈ατ 〉 for τ = 2n/2+1, while they have the best nonlinearity.
The previous results enable us to find the best approximation of F by a
function of the form H(xk). However, improving the complexity of this search
when n grows and F depends on a few inputs only remains an open issue.
Indeed, it seems difficult to use this property of F to simplify the search for the
optimal H. Another open problem is to be able to find in an efficient way the
best approximation of the form G(x) = Tr(λxk).
5 Conclusions
While the monomial equivalence introduced by Rønjom and Cid does not affect
the security of filter generators regarding algebraic attacks, it usually allows to
decrease the complexity of correlation attacks and their variants. Most impor-
tantly, considering a non-bijective monomial mapping enables the attacker to
mount a divide-and-conquer attack by decomposing the set of all nonzero initial
states with respect to some multiplicative subgroup having a smaller order. If
the LFSR length is not a prime, the involved subgroup may be a subfield and
this divide-and-conquer attack can be further improved as in fast correlation
attacks. A counter-measure to avoid these attacks then consists in choosing for
the LFSR length a Mersenne prime, i.e. both n and (2n − 1) are prime.
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